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ESSAY 
IGNORANCE OF LAW IS AN EXCUSE -
BUT ONLY FOR THE VIRTUOUS 
Dan M. Kahan* 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a 
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his 
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the 
vaguer sanctions of conscience. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1 
It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal 
could not have known that he was breaking the law, but to admit 
[mistake of law as an] excuse at all would be to encourage ignorance 
where the law-maker has determined to make men know and obey, 
and justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger inter­
ests on the other side of the scales. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.2 
It's axiomatic that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." My aim 
in this essay is to examine what the "mistake of law doctrine"3 
reveals about the relationship between criminal law and morality in 
general and about the law's understanding of moral responsibility 
in particular. 
The conventional understanding of the mistake of law doctrine 
rests on two premises, which are encapsulated in the Holmesian ep­
igrams with which I've started this essay. The first is liberal positiv­
ism. As a descriptive claim, liberal positivism holds that the content 
of the law can be identified without reference to morality: one 
needn't be a good man to perceive what's lawful, Holm.es tells us; 
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. B,A. 1986, Middlebury; J.D. 
1989, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to the Russell J. Parsons & Jerome S. Weiss Funds for 
Faculty Research at the University of Chicago Law School for generous financial support; to 
Albert Alschuler, Kate Anderson, Darryl Brown, Elizabeth Garrett, Jack Goldsmith, Tracey 
Meares, Martha Nussbaum, John Parry, and Eric Posner for instructive comments on an ear­
lier draft; and to Jason Fliegel for first-rate research assistance. 
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897). 
2. OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE CoMMON LAW 41 (Belknap Press 1963) (1881). 
3. I will use this phrase as a generic shorthand for the proposition that neither ignorance 
of the existence of penal law nor a mistake as to the meaning of that law is (ordinarily) an 
excuse. See generally JosHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CR!MINAL LAw 147 (2d ed. 1995) 
(setting forth rule and exceptions). 
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one need only understand the consequences in store if one should 
choose to act badly.4 The nonnative side of liberal positivism urges 
us to see the independence of law from morality as a good thing. In 
a pluralistic society, the law should aspire to be comprehensible to 
persons of diverse moral views. What's more, it should avoid em­
bodying within itself a standard of culpability or blame that de­
pends on an individual's acceptance of any such view as orthodox; 
in a liberal society, even the bad man can be a good citizen so long 
as he lives up to society's rules.s 
Liberal positivism supports denying a mistake of law defense 
when combined with a second premise: the utility of legal knowl­
edge. 6 Under the liberal positivist view, the law disclaims any reli­
ance on the moral knowledge of citizens, as well as any ambition to 
make them value morality for its own sake. Accordingly, to pro­
mote good (that is, law-abiding) conduct, it becomes imperative 
that citizens be made aware of the content of the law and the conse­
quences of breaking it. Hence, the law shows no mercy for those 
who claim to be ignorant of what the criminal law proscribes, a po­
sition that maximizes citizens' incentive to learn the rules that "the 
law-maker has determined to make men know and obey."7 
I want to challenge the accuracy of this account of why igno­
rance of law does not excuse. In its place, I'll suggest an alternative 
understanding, which rests on premises diametrically opposed to 
the Holmesian aphorisms that undergird the classic account. 
The first premise of this anti-Holmesian conception is legal mor­
alism. 8 This principle asserts that law is suffused with morality and; 
as a result, can't ultimately be identified or applied law without the 
making of moral judgments. It asserts, too, that individuals are ap­
propriately judged by the law not only for the law-abiding quality of 
4. On the independence of law from morals, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
185-212 {2d ed. 1994). 
5. On the connection between legal positivism and liberal political theory, see Jeremy 
Waldron, Kant's Legal Positivism, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1535 {1996). 
6. Jerome Hall, at least, viewed liberal positivism as more or less sufficient to support the 
mistake of law doctrine. See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 383 
(2d ed. 1960) ("[T]here is a basic incompatibility between asserting that the law is what cer­
tain officials declare it to be . . .  and asserting, also . . •  that the law is, what defendants or 
their lawyers believed it to be."). For a compelling rebuttal, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RE­
THINKING CruMINAL LAW § 9.3, at 733-34 (1978). 
7. HoLMES, supra note 2, at 41; see also GLANVILLE WILUAMs, CRIMINAL LAW: THE 
GENERAL PART 289 {2d ed. 1961) Gustifying the doctrine on the same grounds). 
8. For a general account of this idea and a discussion of the tension between liberalism 
and a conception of punishment that takes account of an offender's character and values, see 
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Mora/ism and Liberalism, 37 Aruz. L. REv. 73 {1995). 
October 1997] Ignorance of Law 129 
their actions but also for the moral quality of their values, motiva­
tions, and emotions - in a word, for the quality of their characters. 9 
The second premise of the anti-Holmesian view can be called 
the prudence of obfuscation. Moral judgments are too rich and par­
ticular to be subdued by any set of abstract rules; as a result, law 
will always embody morality only imperfectly. That means that 
from the standpoint of legal moralism, private knowledge of the law 
isn't unambiguously good. The more readily individuals can dis­
cover the law's content, the more readily they'll be able to discern, 
and exploit, the gaps between what's immoral and what's illegal. 
The law must therefore employ strategies to discourage citizens 
from gaining knowledge for this purpose. One is to deny an excuse 
for ignorance of law. Punishing those who mistakenly believe their 
conduct to be legal promotes good (that is, moral) behavior less 
through encouraging citizens to learn the law - an objective that 
could in fact be more completely realized by excusing at least some 
mistakes - than by creating hazards for those who choose to rely 
on what they think they know about the law. By denying a mistake 
of law defense, the law is saying, contra Holmes, that if a citizen 
suspects the law fails to prohibit some species of immoral conduct, 
the only certain way to avoid criminal punishment is to be a good 
person rather than a bad one. 
This anti-Holmesian account, I'll argue, not only offers a supe­
rior explanation of why ignorance of the law is not ordinarily re­
garded as an excuse; it also does a better job in explaining why it 
sometimes is. Sometimes it's a crime to engage in an act - for 
example, omitting to file a tax return or failing to report certain 
financial transactions - that wouldn't be viewed as immoral were it 
not for the existence of a legal duty. Crimes of this sort are often 
referred to as malum prohibitum - wrong because prohibited -
and are distinguished from crimes that are malum in se - wrong in 
themselves independent of law. Malum prohibitum crimes are the 
ones most likely to be interpreted as permitting mistake of law de­
fenses.10 This aspect of the doctrine defies both premises of the 
classic position: to distinguish malum prohibitum crimes from ma-
9. For the exploration of this theme in connection with various other doctrines of sub­
stantive criminal law, see Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1423 
(1995), and Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 269 (1996). 
10. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separa­
tion in Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625, 646 (1984); Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant 
to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARv. L. REv. 469, 478-79 (1996); Michael L. Travers, Com­
ment, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1301 (1995). 
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lum in se ones, courts must employ moral judgments of the sort that 
liberal positivism forbids; and by allowing a mistake of law defense 
for malum prohibitum crimes, courts relax citizens' incentives to 
learn the law. Excusing someone for ignorance of a malum prohib­
itum crime makes perfect sense, however, under the anti­
Holmesian view: since morality abstracted from law has nothing to 
say about the underlying conduct, a person can't be expected to rely 
on her perception of morality rather than her understanding of 
what such laws prohibit; because even a good person could make 
that kind of mistake in such circumstances, the defendant is 
excused. 
A final advantage associated with the anti-Holmesian under­
standing of mistake of law is that it more completely defends the 
doctrine from the standard criticism made of it. Denying a mistake 
of law defense, it is said, sanctions punishment of the morally 
blameless.11 The classic conception demurs: "[J]ustice to the indi­
vidual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side 
of the scales."12 But the anti-Holmesian conception goes further, 
showing that the standard criticism rests on a truncated understand­
ing of when punishment is just: a person is rightly condemned as a 
criminal wrongdoer not only for knowingly choosing to violate the 
law, but also for exhibiting the kind of character failing associated 
with insufficient commitment to the moral norms embodied in the 
community's criminal law. 
My argument will unfold in three Parts, each of which tells the 
story of a citizen who made, or at least claimed to have made, a 
mistake of law. Part I describes the case of Julio Marrero, a federal 
prison guard who reasonably but mistakenly concluded that he was 
authorized to carry a handgun; the failure of his mistake of law de­
fense discredits the claim that the doctrine is geared toward maxi­
mizing citizens' incentive to learn the law. Part II takes up the case 
of Cleora Olive King; her conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance exposes the jaundiced eye with which the law regards 
those who do what they think is legal rather than what they know is 
moral. Part ill examines the case of John Cheek, an offender 
11. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 9.3, at 731, 735; Douglas Husak & Andrew von 
Hirsch, Culpability and Mistake of Law, in AcnoN AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 157, 159, 
174 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993); John T. Parry, Reasonable Reliance on Official Interpre­
tations of Criminal Law: Entrapment by Estoppel, Mistake of Law, and the Risk Against 
Estopping the Government, 25 AM. J. CruM. L. (forthcoming 1997); cf. John Calvin Jeffries, 
Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 209 
(1985) ("If notice of illegality is an essential prerequisite to the fairness of punishment, how 
can the law be indifferent to claims of honest and reasonable mistake?"). 
12. HoLMES, supra note 2, at 41. 
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whose right to assert a mistake of law defense for criminal tax eva­
sion proves that ignorance of the law is an excuse - but only for 
the virtuous. 
I. MARRERO: THE IMPUDENCE OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 
Who exactly is the mistake of law doctrine afraid of? The an­
swer suggested by the classic view is the strategically heedless. Were 
mistake of law a defense, a person bent on violating the rights of 
others - Holmes's "bad man" - could evade punishment by re­
maining studiously ignorant of his legal duties. 
But the specter of strategic heedlessness is a fairly obvious piece 
of misdirection. To be sure, strict liability for mistakes of law takes 
the profit out of deliberate ignorance, but it's such a wildly overin­
clusive solution to that problem that it's impossible to view the stra­
tegically heedless as more than a bit player in the mistake of law 
drama. The real protagonist is someone else; to see who, consider 
People v. Marrero.13 
Julio Marrero was charged with unlicensed possession of a 
handgun. When police arrested him (at 1:00 a.m. at a Manhattan 
disco), Marrero protested that he was authorized to carry the 
weapon under New York law because he was a guard at a federal 
prison in nearby Danbury, Connecticut.14 Marrero's understanding 
of the law was mistaken. 
But understandably so. New York's gun law expressly ex­
empted "peace officers,"15 a term defined, under a section of the 
state's criminal procedure code, to include "correction officers of 
any state correctional facility or of any penal correctional institu­
tion. "16 Marrero concluded that "any penal correctional institu­
tion," as distinguished from "any state correctional facility," meant 
any federal prison. That was how his instructor in a local criminal 
justice course explained it to him, and it was also how the statutes 
were understood by local gun dealers, who routinely sold weapons 
to federal prison guards without demanding proof that the guards 
were licensed to carry such weapons.17 
Indeed, Marrero's reading of the law was so plausible that the 
courts nearly accepted it as correct. The trial court dismissed the 
13. 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987). 
14. See 501 N.E.2d at 1068-69; David De Gregorio, Comment, People v. Marrero and 
Mistake of Law, 54 BROOK. L. R:Ev. 229, 231-33 (1988). 
15. N.Y. Penal Law § 265.20(a)(l)(a) (McKinney 1987). 
16. N.Y. C.P.L. 2.10(26) (McKinney 1987). 
17. See De Gregorio, supra note 14, at 240-41 & n.54. 
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indictment after ruling that federal corrections officers were indeed 
"peace officers" for purposes of the gun law;1s that decision was 
overturned on appeal, but by a court that divided 3-2.19 At the end 
of the day, three of six judges had sided with Marrero's interpreta­
tion. It's hard to imagine a more demonstrably reasonable mistake 
of law. 
At trial, however, Marrero was not afforded the opportunity to 
assert a mistake of law defense to the jury, or even to present evi­
dence about the reasonable basis of that mistake. According to the 
trial court, and ultimately to the New York Court of Appeals, Mar­
rero's ignorance of the law - however reasonable - was no 
excuse.20 
Even this aspect of the case, however, was subject to reasonable 
disagreement. It's usually accepted that a reasonable mistake of 
law is a defense when the mistake relates to an issue of law "collat­
eral" to the "penal law" and negates the mental element of the 
crime.21 For example, a person commits bigamy only if she knows 
that the person she is marrying is already married to someone else; 
although she wouldn't have a defense if she professed to be una­
ware that bigamy is a crime, she might if she made a reasonable 
mistake about the effectiveness of an out-of-state divorce proceed­
ing - an issue collateral to the penal law - and thus didn't know 
that the man she was marrying was the spouse of another.22 By the 
same token, the court could have held that Marrero's reasonable 
mistake about whether a federal prison counts as "any penal correc­
tional facility" negated the requirement that he know he wasn't a 
"peace officer" for purposes of the gun possession statute. 
One could try to distinguish Marrero from the bigamy case on 
the ground that the law defining "peace officer" wasn't genuinely 
collateral to the criminal offense charged. But this distinction isn't 
analytically compelled: Why regard the criminal procedure code's 
definition of "peace officer" as any less collateral to the New York 
gun possession statute than is the law defining who counts as an-
18. See People v. Marrero, 404 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1978). 
19. See People v. Marrero, 422 N.Y.S.2d 384 (App. Div. 1979). 
20. See People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987). 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Anton, 683F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the 
issue of what constitutes "consent of the Attorney General" to re-entry following deporta­
tion is a "collateral" issue for mistake of law purposes). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE, 
§ 2.02 cmt 11 (1985); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusnN W. Scarr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMI­
NAL LAW§ 5.l(d), at 585-86 (1986). 
22. See, e.g., Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459, 463 (1874). This conclusion is not universal, 
however. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusnN W. Scarr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 408-09 
(2d ed. 1986) (noting contrary authority). 
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other's spouse to the crime of bigamy? Either characterization of 
the definition of the peace officer statute - collateral or intrinsic to 
penal law - is conceptually supportable; to choose between them 
requires a reason. 
The New York Court of Appeals's reason for denying a mistake 
of law defense was the Holmesian utility of knowledge principle. 
The point of punishing the legally mistaken, the court explained, is 
"to encourage the societal benefit of individuals' knowledge of and 
respect for the law."23 Were Marrero to be afforded a defense, 
"[m]istakes about the law would be encouraged."24 
There's nothing persuasive in this account. The anxiety of stra­
tegic heedlessness obviously rang false in Marrero's individual case. 
Marrero hadn't deliberately shielded himself from legal knowledge; 
rather he had tenaciously attempted to ferret it out, displaying ex­
actly the type of dedication to legal learning that the utility of 
knowledge purports to value. 
Nor would an excuse for Marrero have promoted strategic 
heedlessness in others. Marrero sought to present a reasonable mis­
take of law defense. Had the court sided with Marrero, it would 
have been establishing, in effect, a negligence standard with respect 
to the existence or meaning of the law defining who counts as a 
"peace officer" under the New York gun possession statute. Under 
such a standard, heedlessness would be a foolish strategy, for a law­
breaker who deliberately failed to take reasonable steps to learn 
the law would be deemed negligent and hence denied a defense. 
In fact, if the goal were truly to maximize private knowledge of 
law, a negligence standard would be unambiguously superior to a 
strict liability standard. This is so because the value of learning the 
law is always higher when the law excuses reasonable mistakes of 
law than when it doesn't. 
A person will take reasonable steps to learn the law when the 
expected benefit of having legal information exceeds the expected 
cost of obtaining it.25 This benefit can take a number of forms. If a 
person invests in learning the law, she might discover that some 
course of conduct that she would otherwise have engaged in - for 
example, carrying an unlicensed handgun - is unlawful and conse-
23. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1069. 
24. 507 N.E.2d at 1073. 
25. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex 
Ante Legal Advice, 8 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 306, 307 {1992); Steven Shaven, Legal Advice About 
Contemplated Act!': The Decision to Obtain Advice, !tr Social Desirability, and Protection of 
Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 127 {1988). 
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quently not worth undertaking given the penalty. Alternatively, 
she might learn that some course of conduct that she otherwise 
would have forgone is in fact perfectly legal and hence worth en­
gaging in after all. But unless she believes the possibility of some 
such benefit is sufficiently high, she won't bother to invest in learn­
ing the law and will instead rely on her untutored judgment about 
what the law happens to be.26 
The probability of realizing a benefit sufficient to defray the cost 
of legal research will always be higher when the law excuses reason­
able mistakes of law than when it doesn't. As Marrero himself dis­
covered, even after a person takes reasonable steps to learn the law, 
there always remains some residual risk that a court will disagree 
with that person's conclusions. In a regime that imposes strict lia­
bility, that person will be punished notwithstanding her reasonable 
effort to learn the law; the prospect that one's legal information will 
tum out to be incorrect thus diminishes the value of obtaining such 
information ex ante. Under a negligence standard, however, rea­
sonable mistakes of law are a defense; accordingly, once a person 
takes reasonable steps to learn the law, she is insured against pun­
ishment even if it turns out that her information is mistaken. Be­
cause the expected value of having legal information is thus higher 
under a negligence standard than under a strict liability standard, 
more individuals will conclude that investing in legal knowledge is 
worthwhile if the law in fact excuses reasonable mistakes.27 
26. See generally Richard S. Murphy & Erin A. O'Hara, Mistake of Federal Criminal 
Law: A Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 SuP. CT. EcoN. REv. 217, 227-30 
(1997) (modeling incentives to acquire legal infonnation). 
27. This point can be illustrated mathematically. Imagine a person is contemplating con­
duct that would confer a benefit of 40. Before she engages in legal research, she believes that 
the conduct is illegal and that the expected penalty for engaging in it is 100. She won't en­
gage in the conduct at that point because the expected return is 40 - 100, or -60. Now imag­
ine that the cost of doing "reasonable research" into the law is 5; imagine further that the 
person believes there is a 50% chance that the research will give her a reasonable belief -
one she estimates, say, is 80% likely to be correct - that the conduct is actually legal. She 
will invest in learning the law at that point only if the 50% chance that her prior belief will 
change in this way is worth more than 5. It will be under a negligence rule: in that case, the 
expected value of obtaining the infonnation is the benefit from acting on the basis of a 
changed belief about the legality of the conduct, discounted by the likelihood that her belief 
will change, minus the cost of obtaining the infonnation, or (40)(0.5) - 5, which equals 15. 
The 0.2 chance that the changed belief will prove to be wrong - that is, that the conduct 
engaged in will be deemed illegal, contrary to the actor's expectations - does not diminish 
the value of obtaining the infonnation, because in that event the actor's mistake will be 
reasonable and hence furnish a defense to criminal liability. Under a strict liability rule, 
however, such a mistake would be no defense; as a result, the actor would have to subtract 
from the expected value of obtaining and acting on favorable infonnation not just the cost of 
getting that information, but also the expected penalty for acting on what turns out to be a 
mistaken reasonable belief, or (40)(.5) - 5 - (.2)(100), which equals -5. Since the expected 
value of obtaining and acting on favorable infonnation under a strict liability rule is negative, 
the individual won't bother to invest in legal research. 
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The relative effects of strict liability and negligence in promoting 
legal knowledge expose the first crack in the classic conception of 
the mistake of law doctrine. Both strict liability and negligence 
punish the heedless; however, negligence rewards all, and strict lia­
bility only some, of the citizens who take reasonable steps to learn 
the law's commands. In other words, if the goal is only to protect 
society from the legally stupid, either strict liability or negligence 
will suffice; but if society genuinely aspires to make its citizens le­
gally wise, it should pick negligence. The steadfast refusal of the 
law to excuse reasonable mistakes, then, displays much more am­
bivalence about private learning of the law than is suggested by the 
Holmesian utility of knowledge principle. 
This ambivalence is laid bare by a second holding in Marrero. 
Marrero grounded his reasonable mistake of law defense in a New 
York statute that was meant to liberalize the common law position 
on when such mistakes excuse.28 That statute - section 15.20(2) of 
the New York criminal code - provided: 
A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he 
engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a 
matter of law, constitute an offense, unless such mistaken belief is 
founded upon an official statement of the law contained in (a) a stat­
ute or other enactment ... or ( d) an interpretation of the statute or 
law relating to the offense, officially made or issued by a public ser­
vant, agency, or body legally charged or empowered with the respon­
sibility or privilege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such 
statute or law.29 
Read literally, section 15.20(2) seemed to excuse Marrero: his mis­
take was "founded upon an official statement of the law contained 
in . . .  a statute," namely, the criminal procedure code provision 
defining who qualifies as a "peace officer." 
The New York Court of Appeals, however, rejected this argu­
ment.30 According to the court, section 15.20(2) was modeled on 
section 2.04(3) of the Model Penal Code, which states: 
A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a de­
fense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when 
... [a person] acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of 
the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained 
in ... a statute or other enactment . . . . 31 
28. See Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1070. 
29. N.Y. Penal Law § 15.20(2) (McKinney 1987). 
30. See Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1070. 
31. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.04(3) (1985). 
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Marrero's mistake clearly didn't entitle him to a defense under this 
standard: the "statement of the law ... contained in" the New York 
procedural code, and on which Marrero relied, was not "afterward 
determined to be invalid or erroneous"; only Marrero's private un­
derstanding of that statement was. As construed by the court of 
appeals, section 15.2 0(2), like section 2.04(3) of the Model Penal 
Code, excuses reasonable reliance only on the mistakes of courts, 
legislatures, and other official interpreters, and not reasonable reli­
ance on a private citizen's own mistakes. 
But was it proper for the court of appeals to read the language 
of section 15.2 0(2) as if it were identical to section 2.04(3)? That 
depends on how far one thinks the New York legislature was trying 
to go in modifying the common law position. The court of appeals 
concluded that the legislature meant to go as far as the drafters of 
the Model Penal Code, who decided to permit reasonable mistake 
as a defense only when a citizen was misled by a government offi­
cial; the court of appeals concluded that the legislature, contrary to 
the literal meaning of the statutory text, did not intend to take the 
additional step of excusing even reasonable private misreadings of 
statutes because the idea that the legislature meant to do something 
that outrageous was, to the court, all but unthinkable: 
[T]he idea was simultaneously to encourage the public to read and 
rely on official statements of the law, not to have individuals conve­
niently and personally question the validity and interpretation of the 
law and act on that basis. If later the statute was invalidated, one, who 
mistakenly acted in reliance on the authorizing statute would be re­
lieved of criminal liability. That makes sense and is fair. To go fur­
ther does not make sense and would create a legal chaos based on 
individual selectivity.32 
... If defendant's argument were accepted, the exception would 
swallow the rule .... There would be an infinite number of mistake of 
law defenses which could be devised from a good-faith, perhaps rea­
sonable but mistaken, interpretation of criminal statutes, many of 
which are concededly complex .... Our holding comports with a stat­
utory scheme which was not designed to allow false and diversionary 
stratagems to be provided for many more cases than the statutes con­
templated. This would not serve the ends of justice but rather would 
serve game playing and evasion from properly imposed criminal 
responsibility.33 
By now it should be clear who the mistake of law doctrine is 
really afraid of. It's not, or at least not only, the strategically heed-
32. Marrero, 501 N.E.2d at 1071 (emphasis added). 
33. 507 N.E.2d at 1073. 
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less, but also the impudently inquisitive - the lay interpreter who 
isn't content to rely on her untutored judgment, supplemented by 
what officials tell her the law means, but who insists on inspecting 
the law for herself and forming her own admittedly reasonable view 
about what the law is saying. It is not that person's deliberate igno­
rance of, but rather her exacting attention to, the law's fine points 
that we must regard as a "false and diversionary stratagem[]," a 
form of "game playing and evasion" that we should construe the 
law to discourage. But this question remains: What exactly makes 
this person's diligent efforts to decode the law so unwelcome? 
II. .KING: Do WHAT'S RIGHT, NoT WHAT 
You THINK Is LEGAL 
To see why the law might regard a little legal knowledge as dan­
gerous and a lot as even more so, consider the story of Cleora Olive 
King. King was convicted of possession of a "controlled sub­
stance," namely, the stimulant phentermine.34 On appeal, King ar­
gued that phentermine wasn't on the state's controlled substance 
list at the time she possessed it. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
rejected that contention, as well as any suggestion that King had a 
viable mistake of law defense about the controlled status of the 
drug: "It is a deeply rooted concept of our jurisprudence that igno­
rance of the law is no excuse. "35 
King wasn't the only one surprised to discover that phentermine 
was a controlled substance at the time she was arrested; so was the 
Minnesota legislature. Only the day before King was charged, the 
legislature had enacted a statute putting phentermine on the list but 
with an effective date of three months hence.36 What the legislature 
didn't know when it passed this statute, however, was that 
phentermine was already a controlled substance in Minnesota and 
had been for over a year.37 
The source of the legislature's mistake was the complexity of the 
scheme by which drugs become controlled substances. Under the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, there are three ways to add 
substances to the state's list: by statute, by administrative regula­
tion, and by what amounts to legal osmosis - the automatic inclu-
34. See State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1977). 
35. 257 N.W.2d at 697. 
36. See 257 N.W.2d at 698 (Otis, J., dissenting). 
37. See 257 N.W.2d at 695. 
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sion of any substance controlled by federal law.38 When a federally 
controlled substance is automatically added to a state's list - as 
was the case for phentermine in Minnesota - no public notice ever 
needs to appear in any species of state law; rather, notice must ap­
pear only if a state agency decides to exclude a federally controlled 
substance from the state's list.39 Consequently, to determine 
whether a particular substance is controlled under state law, one 
must carefully consult not just state but also federal law.40 It's not 
that hard to miss something, as the Minnesota legislature's own 
mistake about phentermine suggests. No one can seriously main­
tain that the Uniform Controlled Substances Act was designed to 
make it easy for members of the general public to figure out the 
law. 
On the contrary, the Act reflects an undisguised resentment of 
such knowledge, and for a very simple reason: it enables loop­
holing. Substances on a jurisdiction's controlled substance list are 
defined by their chemical composition. But it's often possible to 
alter the composition of such a substance slightly without changing 
its pharmacological effects. This creates the opportunity for a le­
gally adroit chemist to evade punishment by continually reformu­
lating her wares in response to legislative attempts to ban them. In 
order to deal with this form of strategic behavior, federal and state 
law delegates the power to designate controlled substances to ad­
ministrative agencies, which can respond much more quickly than 
can legislatures to the development of new designer drugs.41 
The loopholing problem generalizes. Because the means by 
which bad people can invade the rights of others are infinitely nu­
merous and diverse, any attempt to specify them all by statute is 
bound to be incomplete. If the law prohibits altering or counterfeit­
ing vehicle titles, for example, offenders will attempt to achieve the 
same effect by inducing state agencies to issue genuine titles con-
38. See UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Acr § 201(d), 9 U.L.A. pt. II, at 28-29 
(1988); Curry v. State, 649 S.W2d 833, 836 (Ark. 1983) (noting that a federally controlled 
substance becomes a state controlled substance "by operation of law" unless a state agency 
affirmatively blocks designation). 
39. See UNIFORM CoNTRoLLED SUBSTANCES Acr § 20l(d), 9 U.L.A. pt. II, at 28-29 
(1988). 
40. See, e.g., King, 257 N.W2d at 698 ("Had defendant made an effort to ascertain 
whether her possession was lawful, she, as any other member of the public, would have been 
directed to the Federal Register and the delegation provisions here considered • • . •  "). 
41. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 163 (1991) (discussing federal delega­
tion to administrative agencies). 
October 1997] Ignorance of Law 139 
taining false information;42 if it prohibits the interstate transporta­
tion of forged checks, they'll wait until they cross state lines before 
signing them;43 if it bans sawed-off shotguns defined as those with 
barrels of less than 17.5 inches, they'll meticulously cut them down 
to 18.44 Delegating power to an agency to close such gaps as 
quickly as they are discovered is one device for responding to the 
law's persistent incompleteness; another, even more common one is 
prudent obfuscation of the law's outer periphery.45 Statutory terms 
like "fraud," "thing of value," and criminal "enterprise" are vague 
enough to "encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking 
many different forms and [attracting] a broad array of perpetrators 
operating in many different ways."46 They remove offenders' temp­
tation to look for loopholes ex ante by giving courts the flexibility 
to adapt the law to innovative forms of crime ex post. 
The mistake of law doctrine reinforces the prudent obfuscation 
strategy.47 Strict liability makes loopholing hazardous; it says, in 
effect, that the law will punish any misstep should a person attempt 
to negotiate the deliberate complexities and uncertainties of the 
law. A negligence standard, in contrast, would actually magnify the 
loopholing problem - not by encouraging ignorance, but by in­
creasing the returns from investing in legal knowledge. Were the 
law to excuse reasonable mistakes of law, designer drug manufac­
turers and other strategically inquisitive wrongdoers would be re­
warded not only for discovering actual loopholes, but also for 
discovering what they mistakenly but reasonably perceived to be 
loopholes.48 Presumably there would be lots of mistakes like those, 
42. Cf. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (construing the statute to avoid 
such a loophole). 
43. Cf. McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 655 (1982) (refusing to read the statute in 
a manner that would create such a loophole). 
44. Cf. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 634 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ( criticiz­
ing the majority for reading the statute to exacerbate such a loophole). 
45. See generally Dan M Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. Cr. 
REv. 345, 409-12 (discussing the use of statutory vagueness to deter loopholing). 
46. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248-49 {1989) (discussing "enter­
prise" as used in RICO); see also United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) ("When a 'new' fraud develops - as constantly happens - the mail fraud 
statute becomes a stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, 
until particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil."); 
Kahan, supra note 10, at 475-77, 481-82 (discussing the generative character of federal fraud 
and property offenses). 
47. Cf. Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Elhauge, Knowledge About Legal Sanctions, 92 
Mica L. REv. 261, 287-88 (1993) (recognizing the utility of vagueness and restrictions on 
dissemination of legal information if law is believed to be underinclusive). 
48. Again, this point can be illustrated mathematically. Imagine an individual believes 
that the benefit of some form of unlawful conduct is 40, and the expected penalty 100; she 
won't engage in that conduct because the expected return is 40 - 100, or -60. But now imag-
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given the deliberate complexity of criminal laws such as the Uni­
form Controlled Substances Act. Indeed, because a negligence 
standard would give a defense. to anyone who could say that she 
reasonably understood her conduct to be legal, it would almost 
completely vitiate the benefits of statutory vagueness, which seeks 
to combat loopholing precisely by making the outer reaches of the 
law reasonably uncertain. 
The use of prudent obfuscation to discourage loopholing might 
be thought to raise a puzzle from a deterrence point of view. If the 
law aspires to be deliberately vague and complex, and if it tries to 
discourage rather than reward inquiry into the fine points of law by 
punishing even reasonable mistakes, how can it expect individuals 
who want to be law-abiding to know what their legal duties are? 
The answer is supplied by legal moralism. Most individuals 
know how to live law-abiding lives without ever consulting their 
community
,
s criminal code. This is so because they assume that the 
criminal law tracks certain basic moral norms, with which the law­
abiders and law-breakers alike are thoroughly familiar. It seems 
unlikely, for example, that King, who made her living as a prosti­
tute, not as a designer-drug manufacturer, ever looked up 
phentermine on Minnesota
,
s controlled substances list; yet her as­
sumption that the drug was illicit is confirmed by her concealment 
of it in a small foil packet discovered in her underwear upon her 
arrest for soliciting.49 Even the loopholer is aware that her conduct 
conflicts with the moral norms that determine criminal law, or else 
it would never occur to her that there was a need to search out a 
means of evading punishment for her behavior. The law's resent­
ment of legal knowledge is consistent with deterrence, then, be-
ine that she believes that the cost of loopholing - that is, searching for an analogous fonn of 
apparently unregulated conduct- is 5; imagine further that the individual believes that there 
is a 50% chance that such searching will disclose conduct that she is 80% sure (that is, rea­
sonably sure) is legal. Whether loopholing will be worthwhile to that person at that point 
turns on the standard for assessing mistakes of law. Under a negligence standard, loopholing 
pays: the expected value of loopholing is the benefit from engaging in the analogous but 
apparently unregulated fonn of conduct, discounted by the likelihood that the person will 
discover such conduct, minus the cost of searching for it, or (40)(.5) - 5, which equals 15. 
There's a .2 chance, of course, that what appears to be a loophole won't be one in fact- that 
is, that the analogous conduct will also tum out to be illegal, contrary to the individual's 
expectations. But because that mistake of law will be deemed reasonable and hence a de­
fense, this pseudo-loophole will be worth just as much as a genuine one. Loopholing won't 
be worthwhile, however, under a strict liability rule. For in that case, the individual must 
subtract from the expected value of loopholing not just the cost of such activity, but also the 
expected penalty for acting on what turns out to be a mistaken reasonable belief, or 15 -
(.2)(100), which equals -5. Because the expected value of loopholing is negative, strict liabil­
ity should deter the individual from seeking to evade the law in that manner. 
49. See State v. King, 257 N.W.2d 693, 698 n.4 (Minn. 1977). 
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cause the law expects that in the absence of such knowledge 
individuals will be more reliably guided by their knowledge of what 
is moral. 
This expectation, moreover, inflicts another blow to the classic 
conception of the mistake of law doctrine. The Holmesian under­
standing asserts that the doctrine seeks to encourage knowledge of 
the law (utility of knowledge) in order to compensate for the law's 
own indifference to the moral goodness of citizens' motivations (lib­
eral positivism). The truth, though, is that the doctrine attempts to 
discourage legal knowledge (prudent obfuscation) so that individu­
als will be more inclined to behave morally (legal moralism). Strict 
liability warns citizens not to be Holmes's bad man. It tells them 
that if they suspect that some species of immoral conduct may 
evade the reach of the law, the only sure way to avoid punishment 
is to do what they know is right, not what they think is legal.50 
This account makes it easier to see why Marrero came out the 
way it did. Marrero ignored the law's injunction to do what's right 
rather than what one thinks is legal. New York's restrictive gun 
possession law embodies its citizens' strong antipathy toward, and 
fear of, handguns. But rather than defer to those norms, Marrero 
decided to be strategic, availing himself of what must have ap­
peared even to him to be a largely fortuitous gap in the law. That's 
the attitude that made the court see in Marrero's efforts to decode 
the law not an earnest and laudable attempt to obey but rather a 
'!false and diversionary stratagem[]," a form of "game playing and 
evasion."51 Other facts, not even mentioned by the court, also 
likely played a role: that the policy of the federal prison at which 
Marrero worked forbade guards to carry guns either on or off duty; 
that Marrero had supplied his girlfriend and another companion 
with guns, even though they clearly had no grounds for believing 
their possession to be lawful; and that Marrero menacingly reached 
for his weapon when the police approached him in the Manhattan 
club.52 These facts might not have been formally relevant to the 
court's disposition, but they no doubt helped the court to see Mar-
50. Cf. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) ("[M]ost stat­
utes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and the practical 
necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity with 
which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no more than a reasonable degree 
of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it unfair to require that one who deliberately goes 
perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the 
line."). 
51. People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 (N.Y. 1987). 
52. See De Gregorio, supra note 14, at 231-32, 233 n.24. 
142 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:127 
rero as a Holmesian bad man. And in the eyes of the court, a 
Holmesian bad man is plenty bad enough to be designated a 
criminal. 
Another way to see the doctrine's repudiation of liberal positiv­
ism is to consider the relative effects of strict liability and negli­
gence on marginally legal behavior. By marginally legal behavior, I 
mean conduct that is just barely legal because of its exceedingly 
close proximity to the line between what's lawful and what's not. 
This is exactly the kind of conduct that Holmes's bad man wants to 
engage in. A negligence standard makes engaging in such conduct 
relatively safe: even when the line between what's lawful and 
what's not is indistinct, individuals may approach it without appre­
hension so long as they have taken reasonable steps to ascertain 
where that line is drawn, for in that case inadvertent trespasses into 
the territory of illegality will be forgiven. 
Strict liability, in contrast, is much less accommodating. It pun­
ishes persons who inadvertently cross the line notwithstanding their 
reasonable efforts to stay on the lawful side of it. To avoid this 
residual risk of penalty, some persons will choose to steer well clear 
of the line between lawful and unlawful behavior and thus forgo 
even marginally legal behavior.s3 From the point of view of liberal 
positivism, this chilling effect on marginally legal behavior is unfor­
tunate, because the law expects no more from individuals than that 
they behave lawfully. But from the point of view of legal moralism, 
the chilling effect of strict liability is good: because of the persistent 
incompleteness of the law relative to morality, marginally lawful be­
havior - whether the distribution of an uncontrolled designer drug 
or the possession of an unregulated but dangerous firearm - is still 
likely to be immoral and thus worth deterring. 
This preference for moral over purely legal motivation also 
sharpens the focus of the normative issue surrounding the mistake 
of law doctrine. The debate is ordinarily framed as one between 
retributivists, who object to the doctrine's supposed indifference to 
blameworthiness,s4 and utilitarians, who (like Holmes) defend pun­
ishing the blameless for the sake of securing important collective 
ends.ss The grounding of the doctrine in legal moralism, however, 
53. See generally Murphy & O'Hara, supra note 26, at 233-36. 
54. See, e.g., Husak & von Hirsch, supra note 11, at 158-59, 174; Edwin R. Keedy, Igno­
rance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARv. L. REv. 75, 84-85 (1908). 
55. See HoIMES, supra note 2, at 41; WILUAMs, supra note 7, at 289; cf. 1 JoHN AuSTIN, 
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 482 (reprint 1911) (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed., London, 
John Murray 1885) (asserting that the rule is justified by the interest in avoiding fraud). 
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suggests that the debate is really about something else: not whether 
it's justified to punish the morally blameless, but rather when some­
one should be regarded as morally blameworthy. Critics of the doc­
trine view only those who knowingly choose to violate the law as 
deserving of punishment, whereas proponents are unwilling to ex­
cuse from blame a person who behaves immorally merely because 
she happens to believe (mistakenly) that her conduct is legal. 
The proponents' stance is more compelling. Consider, first, a 
person who knows that some species of harmful conduct - whether 
assaulting a pregnant woman for the purpose of killing her fetus,56 
or writing a series of bad checks as part of a "check kiting" 
scheme57 - is immoral, but (mistakenly) believes it to be legal. On 
any viable theory of morality, the choice to harm another in this 
way justifies condemnation, whether or not the conduct is unlawful. 
Because the person would deserve moral condemnation even if it 
turned out that such conduct was legal, it's obvious that her mistake 
about the legality of the conduct doesn't excuse her as a moral mat­
ter. Indeed, if the person comes to the (mistaken) conclusion that 
such conduct is lawful on the basis of legal research, we are likely to 
condemn her more, not less, severely: for in that case her action 
reflects not only the culpable choice to harm another, but also the 
culpable choice to search out means of evading accountability for 
such action. If there is a reason to afford such a person a legal 
excuse, that reason can't be that she is morally blameless. 
, , , Now consider the only slightly more complicated case of a per­
son who engages in wrongful conduct mistakenly believing it to be 
both legal and moral. In her case, we couldn't say that she know­
ingly chose to do wrong. But we might well say that she was culpa­
bly inattentive to her moral obligations. The moral norms that 
typically inform the criminal law express judgments about the high 
worth of important goods and values.58 We expect individuals - at 
least if they are mentally competent adults - to recognize and as­
sent to these appraisals, and if they don't, we judge them negatively 
on that account.59 Imagine a person who assaulted another out of 
56. Cf. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (holding that such conduct is 
not within the terms of the state homicide statute). 
57. Cf. Wtlliams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982) (holding that a statute prohibiting 
"false statement" to a bank should be read not to reach check kiting). 
58. See generally JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN lIAMPToN, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25, 
43-44 (1988); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 
597-98 (1996). 
59. See LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINs: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD AND KINDRED 
PUZZLES OF THE LAW 128-30 (1996). 
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racial animus, or who engaged in sexual relations with a ten-year­
old, and who professed to be unaware that such conduct was im­
moral (much less illegal). Rather than being a ground for sympa­
thy, that person's moral ignorance would itself provide grounds for 
condemning her, for it would reveal that she doesn't care about 
things - the equal dignity of all persons, the psychological and 
physical well-being of children - that she ought to care about, and 
that she does care about other things - racial hatred, sexual domi­
nation of vulnerable and dependent persons - that she shouldn't. 
This sensibility is grounded in an understanding of morality 
that's willing to blame people not just for knowingly choosing to do 
wrong, but also for having bad character. When we condemn some­
one for being inattentive to moral obligations, we are saying that 
she lacks the values that would have motivated a good person to 
perceive the real value of things.60 This understanding of blame is 
commonplace in our ordinary moral practices: "But it was an acci­
dent!"; "So? If you had cared about me, you wouldn't have said 
that/done that/forgotten that." It's also commonplace in criminal 
law: the punishment of negligent homicides condemns persons for 
caring so little about others that they fail to perceive the unreasona­
ble danger they are exposing them to;61 the punishment of persons 
who kill because of unjustifiable anger or hate - even when those 
dispositions are unwilled and interfere with the capacity to conform 
to the law - condemns them for having the bad values that inspire 
bad emotions.62 The mistake of law doctrine likewise condemns in­
dividuals for a character defect - namely, an insufficient commit:'.
, 
ment to the moral values that stand behind the criminal law.63 
60. Cf. R.B. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL 
JusnCE: NoMos XXVII 165, 176-77 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) 
(suggesting a theory of blame that rests on dispositional commitment to appropriate values). 
61. See R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAw & Pmr.. 345, 349-50 
(1993). 
62. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 313-14, 353. 
63. Whether or not these values are universal, people do not always universally subscribe 
to them. Indeed, an individual whom we might be inclined to condemn for being inattentive 
to community norms might well owe her ignorance to her immersion in competing, subcom­
munity norms. Sometimes the law accommodates moral diversity of this kind. See, e.g., 
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610-15 (1994) (reading a mistake of fact defense into 
the National Firearms Act to avoid criminalizing possession of weapons that are not con­
demned by common experience). More often, however, it does not, as reflected in the re­
fusal of the law to recognize the so-called "cultural defense" - the claim that the defendant's 
ignorance of the law should be excused because the conduct in question is moral in her native 
land. See generally Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L REV. 1293 
(1986). Obviously, individuals don't always "choose" their formative communities; the will­
ingness of the law to condemn them for having the values that such unchosen attachments 
engender testifies to the depth of the law's commitment to appraising individuals for their 
characters. Whether a commitment this deep is warranted is another question. 
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Not every mistake of law, however, displays bad character. 
When a person makes the kind of error that even a morally virtuous 
person could make, then her ignorance of the law should be an ex­
cuse. That is the moral of Cheek v. United States. 64 
Cheek neglected to file tax returns for several years. His de­
fense to charges of criminal tax evasion was that he honestly be­
lieved he owed no tax on the salary he earned as a pilot for 
American Airlines. Cheek claimed to have formed this belief on 
the basis of lectures by members of a tax protest group, who per­
suaded him that wages were not taxable income for purposes of the 
federal tax code and that any form of income tax violated the Con­
stitution. After being instructed that these beliefs were not a de­
fense, the jury convicted.65 
But the Supreme Court reversed. Reaffirming precedents of 
over a half century's standing, the Court held that a person can be 
convicted of criminal tax evasion only if he "intentional[ly] vio­
lat[es] . . .  a known legal duty."66 Under this standard, Cheek's mis­
taken beliefs about the unconstitutionality of income taxes would 
not be a defense, the Court reasoned, because a person who de­
clines to comply with the law on that basis is nevertheless aware 
that he has a duty to pay under the tax code.67 However, a person 
who honestly believes - however unreasonably - that wages or 
any other species of income aren't taxable under the code would 
have a defense, for in that circumstance he couldn't be said to 
"know" that he had a duty to pay.68 The Court remanded the case 
for retrial under this standard. 
The Supreme Court, like other courts, tends to give meaning to 
an ambiguous criminal statute not by mechanically parsing its text 
but by imputing to the legislature an intent to enact the reading that 
the Court itself views as best.69 This was so in Cheek. A person is 
guilty of criminal tax evasion only if her failure to pay is "will­
ful[ ],"70 a term that can be understood to refer merely to knowl-
64. 498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
65. See 498 U.S. at 194-96. 
66. 498 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added). 
67. See 498 U.S. at 205-06. 
68. See 498 U.S. at 202-03. 
69. See Kahan, supra note 45, at 370-89. In other words, the Court does exactly what 
Hart and Sacks said it should do with respect to statutes generally. See HENRY M. HART, JR. 
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPU­
CATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
70. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203 (1994). 
146 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:127 
edge of the factual elements of a crime.71 The Court in Cheek 
construed "willful" to mean knowledge of legal duty because of the 
"the complexity of the tax laws."72 "The proliferation of statutes 
and regulations has sometimes made it difficult for the average citi­
zen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and obliga­
tions imposed by the tax laws. "73 It was thus implausible to think 
that Congress " 'intend[ ed] that a person, by reason of a bona fide 
misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to 
make a return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, 
should become a criminal.' "74 
Had the Court accepted the premises of the classic conception 
of the mistake of law doctrine, it certainly wouldn't have used its 
interpretive discretion to engraft a mistake of law defense onto the 
tax code. Denying an excuse for any type of mistake might not be 
the best way to promote knowledge of the law, but allowing one for 
all such mistakes is the surest way to discourage it. If a person can 
be convicted only for intentionally violating known tax obligations, 
then she is better off ignorant. The complexity of the tax code, 
moreover, only multiplies the opportunities for this form of strate­
gic heedlessness. Thus, far from being a ground for softening the 
traditional mistake of law doctrine as the Court in Cheek suggested, 
complexity - as the court in Marrero, for instance, recognized75 -
is a ground for hardening the law's resolve not to excuse ignorance. 
Or at least it is if one accepts the premises of the classic concep­
tion of the doctrine. Matters are more complicated under the anti­
Holmesian conception. 
On the anti-Holmesian view, it's just to punish a person 
notwithstanding her ignorance of law - even complex laws, like 
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act - insofar as her conduct 
reveals that she is insufficiently committed to the moral values that 
the law reflects. Obviously, such an account presupposes that the 
71. See, e.g., United States v. Gunn, 97 F. Supp. 476, 480 (W.D. Ark. 1950) (so construing 
"willfully"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(8)-(9) (1985) (defining "willfully" as "knowingly" 
and indicating that the mental element of the statute is presumed to apply only to facts and 
not to law). See generally Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994) (" 'Willful,' this 
Court has recognized, is a •word of many meanings,' and 'its construction [is] often . . •  influ­
enced by its context."' (alteration in original) (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 
497 (1943))). 
72. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200. 
73. 498 U.S. at 199-200. 
74. 498 U.S. at 200 (quoting United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933)). 
75. See People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 (N.Y. 1987) (noting that precisely be­
cause criminal law is "complex," dispensing with strict liability could create "an infinite 
number of mistake of law defenses [based on] good-faith, perhaps reasonable but mistaken, 
interpretation[s ]"). 
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criminal law embodies moral norms that have an existence in­
dependent of the law itself. Criminal tax provisions don't. Individ­
uals don't have a moral duty, independent of law, to tum over a 
portion of their income to the government. Consequently, we can't 
disregard what a person understood her legal duties to be when we 
are morally appraising her failure to pay a tax. If she knew she 
owed the tax, then we are almost certain to condemn her - not for 
engaging in an intrinsically immoral act, but for attempting to ex­
empt herself from obligations to which other members of the com­
munity have submitted in the interest of the common good.76 But if 
she didn't know, then we must press deeper to see whether such 
ignorance was itself morally culpable. 
It is at this point that the complexity of the tax code becomes 
relevant. The obligation to pay a tax on one's salary or wages is a 
simple matter; ignorance of it displays such a gross degree of inat­
tention to civic duty that one can justly be blamed for that very lack 
of knowledge.77 But the tax code extends far beyond the obligation 
to pay tax on one's wages or salaries: it encompasses as well one's 
duty to pay tax on barter transactions,78 to recognize taxable gains 
associated with swapping comparable mortgage portfolios,79 and to 
make withholdings from the wages of once-weekly maids.so Good 
persons - from the "average citizen"81 to the prospective Supreme 
Court Justice82 - can make mistakes about these duties, which in­
volve no independent moral obligation and which aren't a matter of 
common civic knowledge. A mistake of law defense protects these 
excusably inattentive actors from punishment. Of course, it might 
protect some culpably inattentive ones from punishment, too, inso­
far as courts are obliged, as a matter of statutory construction, to 
treat all mistakes of law alike. Excusing the vicious Cheek for his 
76. See HERBERT MoRRis, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33-34 (1976) (developing a theory 
of desert along these lines). 
77. Cf. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 209-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is incomprehensible to 
me how, in this day, more than 70 years after the institution of our present federal income tax 
system with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913, any taxpayer of competent mentality 
can assert as his defense to charges of statutory willfulness the proposition that the wage he 
receives for his labor is not income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and advises the 
gullible to resist income tax collections." (citation omitted)). 
78. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-2(d) {1996). 
79. See Cottage Sav. Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 559-67 (1991). 
80. See generally Rita L. Zeidner, W &M Panel Hears Pleas for Simplification of Domestic 
Employee Tax Laws, 58 TAX NoTES 1282, 1284 (1993) (reporting the IRS position that 
housekeepers are employees and not independent contractors). 
81. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199. 
82. See Richard L Berke, Favorite for High Court Failed to Pay Maid's Taxes, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 13, 1993, at 1. 
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ignorance was thus necessary to avoid condemning many virtuous 
ones for theirs. 83 
Another way to see this point is to reflect on the difference in 
how we typically regard marginally legal behavior in the tax field 
and how we regard it in other domains of criminal law. When the 
law implements independent moral norms, members of society are 
likely to view marginally legal behavior with disapproval. Because 
of the persistent incompleteness of law relative to morality, persons 
who deliberately try to skirt the line of what separates, say, legal 
from illegal drug distribution, or mere sharp dealing from fraud, 
strike us (usually) as morally bad persons. Punishing them if they 
miscalculate gives them exactly what they deserve and helps to rein­
force for the rest of us what being good entails. But society feels 
differently about persons who try to find "loopholes" in the tax 
code; we don't condemn those persons, but instead compensate 
them with hundreds of dollars an hour, and honor them with status 
and respect. Giving them an excuse for ignorance of law imple­
ments the widely shared (but by no means uncontentious) judgment 
that persons like that shouldn't be deemed criminals when they 
make honest mistakes. 
The anti-Holmesian conception of the doctrine can also explain 
why the Court in Cheek declined to make mistakes of constitutional 
law a defense. These beliefs, the Court explained, "do not arise 
from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of the [code]"; 
"[r]ather, they reveal full .knowledge of the provisions at issue and a 
studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are inva­
lid and unenforceable."84 In other words, it is not morally "inno­
cent" but morally culpable to insist on one's own understanding of 
one's civic obligations when one knows that one's position has been 
considered and rejected by legislatures, administrative agencies, 
courts, and other institutions authorized to define what those obli­
gations are. The willingness to abide by the judgments of those in-
83. This tradeoff, however, might not be as stark as it seems. Although ignorance of the 
obligation to pay a tax on wages stands on the same fonnal footing as ignorance of the tax 
status of a complex business transaction, the reality is that juries are much less likely to 
believe the genuineness of the claimed ignorance in the fonner case than in the latter. A 
court that crafts a mistake of law defense to protect excusably inattentive actors can thus 
bank on the jury's situation sense as a hedge against the appropriation of that defense by 
culpably inattentive ones. Cf. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203-04 ("Of course, the more unreasonable 
the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to 
be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws 
and will find that the Government has carried its burden of proving knowledge."). Cheek 
was in fact convicted on remand. See United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
84. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205-06. 
October 1997] Ignorance of Law 149 
stitutions, while not an uncontested understanding of moral and 
civic virtue, is nevertheless clearly recognizable as such. 
Of course, the tax code isn
,t the only complex body of criminally 
enforceable law that doesn,t implement independent moral norms; 
the same can be said for banking law, broadcasting law, and elec­
tion law, among others. If the point of strict liability is to punish 
individuals who are culpably inattentive to society,s moral norms, 
then we should expect to see courts fashioning exceptions to the 
mistake of law doctrine for all manner of malum prohibitum 
offenses. 
Which is exactly what we do see. Structuring banking transac­
tions so as to avoid having to report them is not "obviously 'evir ,, 
or "inevitably nefarious.',85 There's "nothing inherently wrong in 
making', a campaign contribution without disclosing it to the gov­
ernment.86 There,s nothing about broadcasting on a CB radio with­
out an FCC license thaf s "likely to create danger" or otherwise 
make a "reasonable man . . . aware that he [is doing something] 
forbidden.,'87 Exporting and importing "amphibious vehicles, 
pressure-breathing suits, [and] aerial cameras" can be done "inno­
cently', and thus can,t be analogized to distribution of illicit "sub­
stances which are known generally to be controlled by government 
regulation, such as heroin or like drugs.'
,88 In all of these settings, 
and in various others,89 courts have recognized mistake of law as a 
defense because the underlying conduct violates no moral norms 
independent of the law that prohibits it. 
85. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144-48 (1994). 
86. State v. Azneer, 526 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Iowa 1995); see also United States v. Curran, 
20 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that unreported campaign contributions are not 
"obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad"'). 
87. United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53, 62 (7th Cir. 1977). 
88. United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1976). 
89. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1985) (recognizing a mistake 
of law d_i:fense for the misuse of food stamps on the ground that regulations relating to their 
use cover "a broad range of apparently innocent conduct," from destroying them to using 
them to buy food from a store charging above-normal prices to food stamp program partici­
pants); United States v. Jonas Bros., 368 F. Supp. 783, 784-85 (D. Alaska 1974) (holding that 
the mistake of law defense is available to the federal offense of transporting wildlife in viola­
tion of state Jaw if the state law in question is a malum prohibitum state hunting restriction); 
Long v. State, 65 A.2d 489, 498 (Del. 1949) (recognizing a reasonable mistake of law defense 
where the conduct is "neither immoral nor anti-social in our culture"); Commonwealth v. 
Rudnick, 60 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Mass. 1945) ("The indictment being for conspiracy to commit 
an offense which is malum prohibitum only (alteration of building without a permit from 
building commissioner], there must have been an intent to do wrong • . .  and • • .  knowledge 
of the existence of the law and knowledge of its actual or intended violation."); cf. United 
States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29, 35 (D.D.C. 1974) (recognizing the "rule that mistake of 
Jaw often is a defense to malum prohibitum crimes" but concluding that "unauthorized entry 
and search • . .  are malum in se"). 
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Still, courts don't invariably recognize mistake of law defenses 
for crimes of this kind. As a statement of black letter law, the rule 
that ignorance of law excuses malum prohibitum - but not malum 
in se - crimes is overbroad; indeed, it takes no real detective work 
to find cases that say just the opposite - that ignorance of law is no 
excuse "whether the crime charged is malum prohibitum or malum 
in se"90 - although that proposition too is (as I've just shown) 
wildly overstated. So why do courts permit mistake of law as a de­
fense only selectively across malum prohibitum crimes? 
The answer, the anti-Holmesian view suggests, is in part a mat­
ter of timing. Well into the first decades of the twentieth century, 
the law's resistance to excusing legal ignorance was nearly absolute. 
But it wasn't until about that time that the criminal law was pressed 
into the service of regulating essentially malum prohibitum con­
duct. So long as there was an essential unity between criminal law 
and community moral norms, the uncompromising application of 
strict liability was the best means for implementing prudent obfus­
cation and legal moralism. The absolutism of this approach came 
into tension with the (anti-Holmesian) premises of the doctrine, 
however, with the advent of malum prohibitum crimes, and it 
wasn't long after that that courts began to recognize exceptions to 
the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse.91 There was a 
transition period, though, during which some courts resisted any 
softening of the doctrine; and their resistance, memorialized in the 
case reports, continues to furnish a convenient rhetorical foothold 
when a contemporary court is inclined to deny a mistake of law 
defense for a crime that looks malum prohibitum. 
A court is most likely to feel this inclination in two circum­
stances. The first, again, is when ignorance of the law - even a 
malum prohibitum one - connotes bad character. Ignorance 
doesn't connote bad character when the statutory scheme in ques­
tion regulates the common place activities of ordinary citizens 
whose contact with intricate laws - such as the tax code - is un­
derstandably irregular and fleeting. But matters are different when, 
say, the defendant is a sophisticated participant in a "closely regu­
lated" industry;92 we expect "repeat players" to be attentive to the 
90. E.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F.2d 522, 530 (8th Cir. 1937); State v. McDer­
mott, 220 A.2d 38, 43 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1965). 
91. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933). 
92. See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1285 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United 
States v. Gunn, 97 F. Supp. 476, 480 (W.D. Ark. 1950) (justifying the denial of a mistake of 
law defense for a company ignorant of the licensing requirement for interstate shippers on 
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rules of the game.93 Matters are different, too, when someone is 
engaged in behavior that, while not strictly speaking immoral, nev­
ertheless exposes the public to unusually high risks: it might not 
occur to someone who is transporting "[p]encils, dental floss, [or] 
paper clips" that his conduct is subject to stringent safety regula­
tions, but if it doesn't to someone who is transporting "dangerous 
or deleterious devices . . .  or obnoxious waste materials,"94 then 
he's missing a critical faculty of moral perception. In these particu­
lar settings, ignorance of a malum prohibitum obligation, no less 
than ignorance of a malum in se one, expresses a culpable failure to 
attune oneself to basic civic norms. 
The second circumstance in which judges might be tempted to 
deny that malum prohibitum crimes get special treatment is when 
they want to avoid the burden of explaining why they really view 
the conduct in question as malum in se. It goes without saying that 
the line between prohibitum and in se will often be blurry. It should 
go without saying as well that drawing the line will often be a con­
troversial and even politically perilous task for a court to under­
take. It's inconvenient to declare the transporting of alcohol during 
and immediately after Prohibition to be intrinsically immoral;95 it's 
risky to be seen as jumping into the fray when management ejects a 
union official from company property.96 Life is much easier for a 
court in these and like cases when it can simply invoke a rule -
"ignorance of the law is never an excuse, for malum prohibitum of­
fenses or malum in se ones" - that spares it the burden of justify­
ing the denial of a defense. But against the background of all the 
malum prohibitum crimes that now do get mistake of law defenses, 
the invoking of such a rule serves only to conceal, and does not 
the ground that the company engaged in sustained dealings with an interstate shipper and 
thus "is presumed to have a practical knowledge of the law commensurate with its duties"). 
93. Cf. Murphy & O'Hara, supra note 26, at 257. Indeed, courts sometimes draw distinc­
tions between sophisticated, rep.eat players and unsophisticated, intermittently regulated par­
ties, affording a mistake of law defense to the latter but not the former. Compare United 
States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 796-97 (9th Cir. 1993) (allowing a mistake of law defense for 
an independent transporter who was unaware of permit requirements for customer's waste) 
with United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1284 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (denying the defense 
for managers of a toxic waste facility because they "are clearly in the best position to know 
their own permit status"). 
94. United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1971) 
(transportation of hazardous chemicals); accord United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 
1284-85 (9th Cir. 1993) (discharge of toxic wastes). 
95. Cf. Blumenthal v. United States, 88 F.2d 522, 530-31 (8th Cir. 1937) (denying the 
defense for transporting liquor across state lines without proper labeling). 
96. Cf. State v. McDermott, 220 A.2d 38, 43 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1965) (denying the defense to 
a union official convicted of trespass who believed, allegedly mistakenly, that he had a statu­
tory right to be on plant property). 
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genuinely eliminate, the need for the court to make contentious, 
context-specific judgments about which actors have characters good 
enough to be excused for their mistakes of law. 
That such discretion must be exercised, moreover, completes 
the indictment of the classic conception of the mistake of law doc­
trine. Had the doctrine embodied the normative side of liberal pos­
itivism - that is, had it been accepted by courts that the law ought 
to judge persons only by the conformity of their actions to the stan­
dard laid down by law and not by the conformity of their characters 
to an extralegal conception of moral virtue - courts would never 
have perceived the need to reform the doctrine upon the advent of 
malum prohibitum crimes. Moreover, had courts been intent on 
conserving the positivistic character of the law as a descriptive mat­
ter, they would never have reformed it by making an exception for 
malum prohibitum crimes, much less only for certain of them. For 
one can determine whether a particular species of conduct -
whether possessing a gun, distributing a drug, or neglecting to pay a 
tax - is malum in se or malum prohibitum only by appraising that 
conduct in light of moral norms external to positive law. Once it is 
acknowledged that an important component of the law depends on 
this kind of appraisal, a person who "want[s] to know the law," 
even if she wants to know "nothing else,"97 has no choice but to 
view the world through a good person's eyes. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay had two aims. One was to identify the true basis of 
the mistake of law doctrine; the other was to distill from that ac­
count some general conclusions about the relationship between 
criminal law and morality. I'll now take stock. 
The classic conception of the mistake of law doctrine, I've ar­
gued, is false. Th.at understanding asserts the utility - indeed, the 
indispensability - of widespread legal knowledge in a political re­
gime that disclaims any reliance on its citizens' commitment to a 
moral orthodoxy. If maximizing legal knowledge were really the 
objective, however, the law would apply a negligence standard, 
rather than a strict liability standard, to legal mistakes. Refusing to 
excuse even reasonable mistakes discourages investments in legal 
knowledge by making it hazardous for a citizen to rely on her pri­
vate understanding of the law. Th.is resentment of legal knowledge 
makes sense because the doctrine assumes, contrary to the classic 
97. Holmes, supra note 1, at 459. 
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conception, that individuals are and should be aware of society's 
morality and that morality furnishes a better guide for action than 
does law itself. Thus, far from trying to maximize the incentive that 
presumptively bad men have to know the law, the doctrine seeks to 
obscure the law so that citizens are more likely to behave like good 
ones. 
What does this conception of the doctrine reveal about the crim­
inal law more generally? One lesson is that the criminal law is in­
tensely moralistic. The mistake of law doctrine is an integral part of 
a strategy of prudent obfuscation aimed at remedying the persistent 
imperfection of criminal law relative to morality. The standard of 
culpability reflected in the doctrine, moreover, judges individuals 
not just for the conformity of their conduct to law, but also for the 
conformity of their values to society's moral norms. Indeed, be­
cause it generally excuses individuals for mistakes of law that even 
a virtuous person would make, the doctrine demands that courts 
interpret society's morality in the course of interpreting its criminal 
statutes so that they can determine which mistakes of law reflect 
bad character. 
But another lesson that emerges from the anti-Holmesian ac­
count is that the law is ambivalent - indeed, almost embarrassed 
- about exactly this kind of moralizing. The positivistic idiom of 
the classic account drives the rhetoric of the decisions, even when 
the decisions defy that account's central premises in substance. 
Legal moralism, secured by prudent obfuscation, is the truth of the 
mistake of law doctrine. But it is a truth that one can get at only by 
prying back the doctrine's antimoralistic, Holmesian veneer. 
Stealthy moralizing is in fact endemic to criminal law. The prin­
ciple of legality, for example, proclaims that legislatures alone are 
responsible for defining crimes and disavows any lawmaking role 
for courts;9s the truth, however, is that criminal statutes typically 
emerge from the legislature only half-formed and must be com­
pleted through contentious, norm-laden modes of interpretation 
that are functionally indistinguishable from common-law making.99 
Public debate about the death penalty is dominated by empirical 
claims relating to deterrence, when in fact parties on both sides 
ground their positions in nonempirical but contested moral be­
liefs. mo The rhetoric of duress, provocation, and insanity depicts 
98. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CiuMINAL SANCI10N 79-102 (1968). 
99. See Kahan, supra note 45, at 367-89. 
100. See generally Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: 
Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, J. Soc. lssUES, Summer 1994, at 19; Tom R. 'fyler & 
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emotions in pseudo-scientific, mechanistic terms that obscure the 
judgmental appraisals that decisionmakers make about the values 
that emotions embody.101 The false prominence of liberal positiv­
ism and the utility of legal knowledge in the mistake of law doctrine 
is of a piece with the law's general reticence about displaying its 
moral core. 
I have defended the moralizing that animates the mistake of law 
doctrine, but not the duplicity that surrounds it. As the stories of 
Julio Marrero, Cleora Olive King, and John Cheek shoµld make 
clear, the kinds of moral judgments that the mistake of law doctrine 
reflects are highly contentious. Is possession of a handgun malum 
in se or malum prohibitum?102 Are the persons who seek out "tax 
loopholes" truly virtuous? Are the ones who make mistakes about 
the status of controlled substances invariably vicious?103 If not, why 
do courts see the world this way? The moralizing that occurs with 
other criminal law doctrines is subject to just as much contestation. 
Such judgments are on balance a good thing, and are probably inev­
itable in any event, but they ought at least to be made openly. 
When contentious moral judgments are camouflaged in seemingly 
nonjudgmental rhetoric, decisionmakers are freed from the con­
straints of public accountability, and citizens are denied the oppor­
tunity to examine, criticize, and reform the judgments that their law 
reflects. 
It might not be realistic to expect the criminal law always to get 
it right when it moralizes, particularly in light of the dissensus that 
characterizes moral issues in cont�mporary society. But precisely 
because citizens disagree about what's good, insisting that the law 
be honest when it moralizes is definitely not too much to ask. 
Renee Weber, Support for the Death Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime, or Symbolic 
Attitude?, 17 L. & SoCY. REv. 21 {1982). 
101. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 372-74. 
102. Compare the New York Court of Appeals's decision in Marrero with Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 613 (1994), in which the U.S. Supreme Court read a mens rea 
requirement into a silent statute in order to respect "the common experience that owning a 
gun is usually licit and blameless conduct" 
103. Cf. Idaho v. Fox, 866 P.2d 181 {Idaho 1993) (holding that a mistake of law is no 
defense for the possession of the asthma medication ephedrine, which was a controlled sub­
stance in Idaho but an over-the-counter drug in other states). 
